In search of a preferred preference elicitation method: A test of the internal consistency of choice and matching tasks by Attema, Arthur & Brouwer, Werner
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
In search of a preferred preference
elicitation method: A test of the internal
consistency of choice and matching tasks
Arthur Attema and Werner Brouwer
Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus University Rotterdam
20 January 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36100/
MPRA Paper No. 36100, posted 20 January 2012 19:24 UTC
  
In search of a preferred preference elicitation method 
A test of the internal consistency of choice and matching tasks 
 
Arthur E. Attemaa and Werner B.F. Brouwerb 
 
a
 (Corresponding author) iBMG/iMTA, Erasmus University, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, the 
Netherlands. E-mail: attema@bmg.eur.nl, --31-10.408.91.29 (O); --31-10.408.90.81 (F) 
b iBMG/iMTA, Erasmus University, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, the Netherlands. E-mail: 
brouwer@bmg.eur.nl. 
 
 
January, 2012 
 
 
ABSTRACT.  The numerous reports on preference reversals in preference elicitations pose a 
great challenge to empirical economics. Many studies have found that different procedures 
may generate substantially different preferences. However, little is known about whether one 
procedure is more susceptible to preference reversals than another. Therefore, taking the 
preference reversals as a robust behavioral pattern, guidelines are called for to provide 
directions regarding a preferred preference elicitation task. This paper puts forward a new test 
of the internal consistency of choice and matching tasks, based on “internal preference 
reversals”. We replicate the preference reversal phenomenon and find a significant higher 
consistency within choice tasks than within matching tasks. 
Key Words: preference reversal, internal consistency, scale compatibility, loss aversion, time 
tradeoff method 
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1. Introduction 
 
A major problem for classical decision theory is the frequent finding of preference 
reversals, i.e., the phenomenon that the relative evaluation of two or more items by an 
individual depends systematically on the elicitation method used (Cubitt et al., 2004). Starting 
with Lindman (1971) and Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971), preference reversals have been 
extensively investigated in the context of lotteries (Tversky and Thaler, 1990). The early 
studies on preference reversals compared a choice between two gambles and the selling prices 
of these gambles. If a specific gamble is preferred to another, economic theory predicts that 
this gamble should also be sold at a higher price than the other. If someone prefers prospect A 
over B, one would expect that person to be willing to pay more for A too. However, it turned 
out that, when offering one gamble with a high probability of winning a modest amount of 
money (a P-bet) and one gamble with a low probability of winning a relatively large amount 
of money (a $-bet), many individuals chose the first option but at the same time stated a 
higher price for the second one. Preference reversals were found in several other tasks as well, 
and in a variety of different environments (Seidl, 2002).  
 Because of the robust nature of this phenomenon, alternative theories were developed 
to explain it (Fishburn, 1984; Fishburn, 1985; Holt, 1986; Karni and Safra, 1987; Loomes and 
Sugden, 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 1983; Tversky et al., 1988). Tversky et al. (1990) 
empirically tested these theories in a carefully designed experiment, and found convincing 
evidence in favor of a theory that drops the procedural invariance assumption (Tversky et al., 
1988). They claimed that the violation of procedural invariance to a large extent explained the 
preference reversal phenomenon. The main causes of violation of procedural invariance are 
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scale compatibility and loss aversion.1  Scale compatibility means that people assign greater 
weight to attributes represented in units similar to those of the response variable, which can 
generate a large distorting influence (Borcherding et al., 1991; Delquié, 1993; Huber et al., 
2002; Tversky et al., 1988). Loss aversion is the phenomenon that individuals handle gains 
and losses as seen from a reference point differently, with losses looming larger than gains 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). 
 In this paper we focus on the kind of preference reversal that is caused by differences 
in matching and choice tasks, because these are the two most common elicitation tasks. In a 
choice task, an individual has to choose one option, possibly consisting of multiple attributes, 
out of a set of options. In matching, one attribute in one of the options is left blank and the 
subject is asked to give a value for this attribute that makes him indifferent between the 
options. Instead of just testing for the existence of preference reversals, however, we pursue 
another line of research. 
Since the literature on preference reversals is large, we can be confident that the task 
used in assessing preferences exerts a substantial influence on the outcomes (Maafi, 2011). 
But, even if we are certain about the existence and the causes of preference reversals, what 
does this imply for the practical use of different assessment procedures? Is there one task that 
elicits preferences more consistently than others? Indeed, while one may prefer revealed over 
stated preference, the latter is commonly used in situations where revealed preference data 
cannot be ethically or meaningfully obtained, such as in the context of health. Hence, the 
question of a preferred elicitation method remains pivotal. 
The differences between choice and matching elicitation tasks have been investigated 
before (Bostic et al., 1990; Huber et al., 2002; Loomes, 1988; Stalmeier et al., 1997). The 
major conclusion from these studies was that elicitation of indifferences by means of choices 
                                               
1
 Recently, however, (Butler and Loomes, 2007) and (Schmidt and Hey, 2004) casted doubt on the validity of 
the scale compatibility hypothesis and suggested that preference reversals are partly caused by a higher error 
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yields better results than indifferences obtained by matching, in the sense that series of 
choices generated fewer inconsistencies than matching questions (Bostic et al., 1990), 
although Loomes (1988) and Loomes and Sugden (1989) found preference reversals for both 
tasks in a monetary lottery setting. Arrow et al. (1993) recommended the use of choices 
instead of open-ended question in contingent valuation studies, because they consider the 
open-ended questions not realistic and sensitive to strategic responses. 
This paper seeks to extend the above research by performing a specific test of the 
internal consistency of choice and matching tasks. We test this in a health valuation setting, 
where these procedures are frequently used (also to inform actual decisions). In particular, we 
use a time tradeoff (TTO) valuation, which is a popular method to elicit preferences for health 
states (Dolan et al., 1996a; Dolan et al., 1996b; Lamers et al., 2006) and has been used to 
derive value sets in a number of countries, including Denmark, Germany, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the UK (http://www.euroqol.org). In short, the method asks an 
individual to trade off life years in order to improve health status. However, there exist 
different, strategically equivalent, ways to elicit preferences with this method. This allows us 
to test the internal consistency of choice and matching tasks. That is, we test for preference 
reversals within methods, whereas the usual preference reversal is between methods. If 
preference reversals are also found within methods, this seems to be an even more elementary 
violation. 
Our test relies on the observation that in tasks with two options, each consisting of two 
attributes, there are actually two ways to perform the matching task, and two ways to perform 
the choice task. These four different procedures are all strategically equivalent, i.e., they 
should generate the same preference orderings according to standard economic theory. Now, 
given the finding of systematically different results between choice and matching procedures, 
                                                                                                                                                   
frequency among pricing than among choices. 
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we can investigate the results of the two procedures within matching and the results of the two 
procedures within choice. This allows us to test whether choice or matching generates more 
inconsistencies (i.e., preference reversals) across different variations. If the choice task for 
example generates the same results for its two strategically equivalent variants, whereas the 
matching task generates systematic differences, this would suggest that the former has a 
higher internal consistency than the latter. It is known, for instance, that the two different 
matching procedures cause significantly different results (Delquié, 1993). 
The main contribution of this study is that it provides a criterion (internal consistency) 
that can be used to assess the relative performance of different elicitation methods. Although 
this is of course merely one out of several possible evaluation criteria, it is a first step in 
developing these criteria, which may help to develop more guidance in the choice between 
alternative elicitation methods. 
We introduce terminology and explain underlying theory in Section 2. Section 3 
describes the details of our experiment. The results of the experiment are presented in Section 
4. Finally, Section 5 contains a discussion of the results and concludes this paper. 
 
 
2. Background 
 
2.1. Terminology and Notation 
We consider preferences over sets of outcomes, with the preference relation í 
assumed to be a weak order, i.e., transitive (if xíy and yíz, then xíz) and complete (either 
xíy, or yíx, or both). The relation í is the commonly adopted preference relation in decision 
theory, with ê denoting the asymmetric part of í and ~ denoting indifference (i.e., the 
symmetric part). We consider outcomes X, each consisting of two attributes x1 and x2, that is, 
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X=(x1, x2). x1 denotes a particular health state and x2 denotes a number of periods in that 
health state. An individual is assumed to prefer more life years to less in any health state, i.e., 
the relation í satisfies monotonicity in duration: (x1, x2) ê (x1, x2') for all chronic health states 
(x1, x2), (x1, x2') with x2 > x2'. Monotonicity cannot be defined for health status, because this is 
a qualitative variable. Instead, we assume health status is preferentially independent, i.e., for 
all life durations unequal to zero and for all health states x1, x1', (x1, x2) í (x1', x2) ⇔  (x1, x2') 
í (x1', x2') (Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2005). Preference relations over the attributes are derived 
from í. We only investigate two options, Y=(y1, y2) and Z=(z1, z2), at a time, with always 
either y1íz1 and y2Çz2, or y1Çz1 and y2íz2. That is, one option never dominates another and 
tradeoffs have to be made. 
In a choice task, an individual has to choose one option of the set {Y, Z}, with the 
values of all attributes given. In matching, one attribute yi or zi in one option Y or Z is left 
blank and the subject is asked to give a value for this attribute that makes him indifferent 
between the options. A preference reversal is defined as the case where an individual in one 
procedure indicates that YíZ, but reveals the opposite preference, i.e., YÇZ, in the other 
procedure, with at least one preference strict. 
The profile h=(h1,…,hT) denotes a health profile where ht is the health state in period 
t=1,…,T, with T the decision maker’s final period of life. A constant health profile 
h=(h1=α,…,hT=α) is indicated, using the above format, as the option X=(x1=α, x2=T). In other 
words, a constant health profile is described as an option with two attributes, the quality of the 
health state and the duration of that health state. Further, v(ht) is a value function that 
represents the individual’s preferences over health quality and δ(t) denotes the corresponding 
weight given to the value in this period. It can then be shown that, under some reasonable 
axioms, híh´ if and only if ( )
1
( ) ( )
T
t
t
t v hδ
=
∑ ≥ ( )
1
( ) ( ')
T
t
t
t v hδ
=
∑  (Bleichrodt and Gafni, 1996). 
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Similarly, the preference relation YíZ can be evaluated by ( )2 1
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We assume that health profiles are evaluated by the function ( )∑
=
=
T
jt
tt hvthtU )()(),( δ . We 
term the function ∑
=
T
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t)(δ  the utility of life duration for the period between t=j and t=T. For 
convenience, we adopt the following notation throughout: 
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=
=
T
t
tTW
1
)()( δ , 
 
where W(T) is the total utility given to the period between t=1 and t=T. 
The TTO method infers health state utilities by asking subjects to consider two 
constant health profiles: B=(β, nβ) and G=(γ, nγ) with, in general, γêβ and nβ>nγ. When an 
individual is indifferent between these two profiles ((β, nβ)~(γ, nγ)), our model evaluates these 
preferences by the equation: 
 
(2) )()()()( γβ γβ vnWvnW = . 
 
Then, if we normalize v(γ) to 1, we get the following expression for v(β): 
 
(3) )(
)()(
β
γβ
nW
nW
v = . 
 
Eq. 3 makes clear that, in addition to the values of nγ and nβ (of which one is a 
stimulus), one also needs to elicit the utility of life duration function W(.) in order to estimate 
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v(β). We included a separate task for this (see Section 3), but the focus of our study is on the 
procedures to elicit nγ and nβ. 
As indicated above, the equivalence between two options can be obtained via a 
matching task, where the subject is asked to give a value for one blank attribute that makes 
him indifferent between the options. Then, one can fix nβ and directly ask for a value of nγ 
that makes the subject indifferent between the health profiles, or do the opposite, i.e., fixing nγ 
and asking for nβ.2 
Second, in a choice task, an individual has to choose one of the two options. However, 
one choice only reveals that BíG or BÇG, and more choices are needed to yield an 
indifference relation. Then, depending on this choice, the value of either nβ (if B [G] was 
chosen, nβ is decreased [increased]) or nγ (if B [G] was chosen, nγ is increased [decreased]) is 
varied.3 Repeating this procedure allows the elicitation of the indifference point. We use the 
bisection method for this, an algorithm which repeatedly bisects an interval and then selects a 
subinterval in which an indifference point must lie for further processing. Subsequently, we 
determine the indifference point as the midpoint of this interval. 
We therefore separate four procedures to elicit the indifference of interest. These 
procedures are strategically equivalent, so that in principle, they should return the same 
preference orderings. Suppose, for example, that we have two health profiles, described by the 
options B=(β, nβ) and G=(γ, nγ), where β is back pain, nβ the number of years of life with back 
pain (after which death follows), γ is full health and nγ the number of years of life in full 
health (after which again death follows). If we employ a matching procedure, we can now fix 
either nβ or nγ, and ask for the value of the remaining attribute, such that this value renders the 
subject indifferent between these options. Suppose that we fix the value of nβ at 10 years and 
the subject states that indifference occurs at nγ=6 in a matching task. This gives the 
                                               
2
 Because the health states are qualitative, these are both fixed in all procedures. 
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indifference relation (β, 10)~(γ, 6). Procedural invariance entails that this indifference should 
hold no matter what procedure is used. If we, for example, fix nγ=6 and ask for nβ for the 
same health states, we should obtain nβ=10 for this subject. Similarly, using a bisection choice 
procedure where nβ is held fixed should also lead to that indifference, just as setting nγ=6 
should result in nβ=10 after a sufficient number of choices. 
In the above example, where the subject had indicated to be indifferent between (β, 
10) and (γ, 6) in the matching task, and under the usual assumption that this subject prefers 
more life years to less and better quality of life to worse, she should choose B over G when 
nγ<6 and G over B when nγ>6 in a choice task. If this is not the case, this means that the 
subject may, in fact, not be indifferent at the stated value. If she for example chooses the 
option G=(γ, 5) over B=(β, 10), she thus reveals GíB even though G has become less 
attractive compared to the situation at which she was indifferent between B and G in the 
matching task, while B did not change. In other words, there are values for this subject where 
BêG according to the matching question, but at the same time GíB according to the direct 
choice for G. Thus, this response pattern corresponds to a preference reversal. 
For convenience, we suppress notation in what follows and simply denote v(β) by v. 
We use the following terms to distinguish the estimates of v obtained by the four different 
procedures: 
 
-Fixed-nβ choice procedure: cvβ  indicates the estimates obtained by the choice task while 
fixing the duration in health state β (nβ). 
-Fixed-nγ choice procedure: cvγ  indicates the estimates obtained by the choice task while 
fixing the duration in health state γ (nγ). 
                                                                                                                                                   
3
 Obviously, one can also change both nβ and nγ simultaneously (Delquié, 1997), but we do not pursue this 
possibility here. 
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-Fixed-nβ matching procedure: mvβ  indicates the estimates obtained by the matching task 
while fixing the duration in health state β (nβ). 
-Fixed-nγ matching procedure: mvγ  indicates the estimates obtained by the matching task while 
fixing the duration in health state γ (nγ).  
 
2.2. Method 
 
 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
Table 1 represents our within-subject, 2-by-2, design. It makes clear that two factors 
are relevant. One factor is the elicitation method, choice or matching (the horizontal 
comparison). The other factor is the direction of the trade-off: giving up or gaining years of 
life (the vertical comparison). The horizontal comparison therefore tests for preference 
reversals between choice and matching. The vertical comparison, on the other hand, tests for 
the reversibility of the indifference curves obtained by the two procedures. This can be 
clarified by Figure 1. Suppose we employ the fixed-nβ procedure, fixing (β, nβ) and infer the 
amount of nγ such that (β, nβ) ~ (FH, nγ). This indifference could be represented by an 
indifference curve comparable to the solid line in Figure 1. (Of course, in reality we need 
more indifference values to know the precise shape of the curve.) Procedural invariance then 
requires that, if we apply the fixed-nγ procedure, we can use the same indifference curve, i.e., 
starting from (FH, nγ) and moving towards (β, nβ). Hence, the indifference curve would be 
reversible in that case. If, however, the respondent instead elicits the indifference relation 
(FH, nγ) ~ (β, nβ'), with nβ' > nβ, this would imply another indifference curve, as shown by the 
dashed line, indicating irreversibility of the indifference curve (Bleichrodt et al., 2003). 
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<FIGURE 1 HERE> 
 
Scale compatibility is relevant in the horizontal comparison of Table 1, because it is 
liable to affect matching but not choice. However, scale compatibility is not relevant for the 
vertical comparison within matching because there is no change of response scale between 
these two matching tasks, which is the number of life years in both. We therefore attribute any 
difference between mvβ  and 
mvγ  to reference effects (e.g., loss aversion). Scale compatibility 
implies that life years get more weight than health status in the decision of the subject 
(Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2002). As a result, they are more resistant to give up life years in the 
fixed-nβ procedure, and demand fewer additional life years in the fixed-nγ procedure to 
compensate for the deterioration in quality of life. Scale compatibility is therefore predicted to 
increase TTO scores in both procedures of the matching task (Bleichrodt, 2002).  
Loss aversion reinforces the effect of scale compatibility in the fixed-nβ procedure, 
because the life years given up are considered a loss and get more weight, which results in 
even higher TTO scores. On the other hand, loss aversion reduces this upward tendency in the 
fixed-nγ procedure, since the loss of health gets a penalty and the individuals demand extra 
life years in return. Because both loss aversion and scale compatibility are empirically well-
established, it is therefore not clear, a priori, whether there is an upward or downward 
tendency on TTO scores in the fixed-nγ procedure. 
Loss aversion is most often modeled by taking a fixed reference point and multiplying 
the (utility of the) loss by some parameter λ>1. In terms of the two option-two attribute 
example, one option has a gain in one attribute relative to the other option, and a loss in the 
other attribute. The main issue then is what is taken as the reference point. It seems most 
natural that, in case of a matching task, the option where both attributes are given is taken as 
the reference point. Subsequently, the subject will compare the value of the known attribute of 
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the other option to its value in the reference scenario. If the former is lower than the latter, this 
is considered a loss and given more weight. The subject will consequently demand a higher 
gain in the other attribute in return. For instance, consider the fixed-nβ matching procedure. 
The values of both attributes of option B are given and it is likely that B is taken as the 
reference point. This is compared to G where the first attribute involves a gain (γêβ), which is 
traded off against the loss in the second attribute (nγ<nβ). Because this loss gets more weight 
under loss aversion, the subject is more inclined to choose B and thus to demand extra nγ to 
make G as attractive as B. The empirical findings of loss aversion (e.g., Kahneman et al., 
1990; Knetsch, 1989; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) provide highly relevant evidence for the 
latter. 
 
2.3. Tests 
Given the presented framework, our experimental design allows for a number of tests. 
First, we can replicate earlier tests for differences between matching and choice tasks, and for 
the reversibility of the indifference curves. Second, a novelty of our study is that we perform 
these tests simultaneously and, hence, are able to test differences between matching and 
choice tasks for two different procedures, and to test reversibility of the indifference curves 
for both choice and matching. This allows us to test whether, for example, choice tasks are 
more or less susceptible to irreversibility of the indifference curve than matching tasks. In 
particular, we test three hypotheses, which are presented in turn below. 
 
2.3.1. Scale compatibility 
The first hypothesis comprises the horizontal comparison of Table 1, i.e., whether 
choice and matching generate the same values, both for the fixed-nβ and the fixed-nγ 
procedure (H0: cvβ  = mvβ  and cvγ = mvγ ). Our framework predicts higher values for matching than 
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for choice due to scale compatibility, whereas loss aversion is expected to have the same 
influence for choice and matching. Therefore, we expect the choice task to generate lower 
TTO scores than the matching task, for both procedures (HA: cvβ  < mvβ  and cvγ < mvγ ). 
 
2.3.2. Loss aversion 
The second hypothesis similarly involves the vertical comparison of Table 1, i.e., 
whether the fixed-nβ and the fixed-nγ procedures generate the same values, both for the choice 
task and the matching task (H0: cvβ  = cvγ  and mvβ = mvγ ). In our framework, loss aversion has an 
upward influence on TTO scores in the fixed-nβ procedure, and a downward influence on 
TTO scores in the fixed-nγ procedure, for both tasks (Bleichrodt, 2002); whereas, as explained 
above, the influence of scale compatibility does not depend on the procedure. Therefore, we 
expect the fixed-nβ procedure to generate higher TTO scores than the fixed-nγ procedure, for 
both tasks (HA: cvβ  > cvγ  and mvβ > mvγ ). 
 
2.3.3. Preference reversals within tasks 
Our framework does not predict any difference in irreversibility of indifference curves 
between the two tasks (i.e., choice or matching, second hypothesis). However, Bostic et al. 
(1990) found that when prices for gambles are elicited by means of a series of choices instead 
of directly stating a particular amount (i.e., matching), fewer direct choice-pricing preference 
reversals are generated. Moreover, Schmidt and Hey (2004) found evidence for more errors in 
pricing than in choices. Since pricing can be thought of as a kind of matching, this also 
suggests more consistency within choices. If this empirical evidence is transferable to 
preference reversals caused by different procedure as tested in our second hypothesis, we may 
therefore expect the matching task to be more likely to generate preference reversals than the 
choice task. In order to test this more formally, we tested a third hypothesis. This hypothesis 
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tested whether internal consistency within choice was similar to internal consistency within 
matching. We tested this hypothesis by first computing the absolute differences between the 
TTO scores for the two procedures, both for the choice task and for the matching task. 
Therefore, we tested whether mmcc vvvv γβγβ −=− . An extension of the findings by Bostic et 
al. (1990) to our context would imply that choice tasks produce less divergence between the 
fixed-nβ procedure and the fixed-nγ procedure than matching tasks (HA: mmcc vvvv γβγβ −<− ). 
 
 
3. Experiment 
 
3.1. Subjects 
The experiment was performed with 80 undergraduate Business Administration 
students from Erasmus University Rotterdam. They received course credits for their 
participation. Because we used health outcomes, it was not possible to use real incentives. 
 
3.2. Procedure 
The experimental sessions were run by one of the authors with four subjects at a time. 
The subjects were separated by partitions, in order to avoid discussion between them. The 
sessions lasted 30 minutes on average. The experiment was fully computerized and entailed 
the four different TTO tasks, as well as the utility of life duration elicitation task. In addition, 
some other tasks that were part of another study were included in-between these tasks. This 
was expected to reduce remembrance effects. The TTO tasks were ordered in four different 
ways. In particular, there were four computers, each having another ordering (see Table 2). 
Subjects were allocated to these computers randomly. Besides controlling for ordering effects, 
this design enabled a robustness (between-subjects) test of preference reversals. This may be 
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relevant if preference reversals are found between-subjects, but not within-subjects, because 
this would suggest that recall effects abolish within-subjects preference reversals. The utility 
of life duration task was performed at the end of the experiment in all four versions. Practice 
questions were included at the beginning of each task. 
 
<TABLE 2 HERE> 
 
We described the health state using the domains contained in the EuroQol 5D (EQ-
5D) questionnaire. The EQ-5D is a popular questionnaire for eliciting health state utilities 
(Dolan, 1997). It describes health states in terms of five dimensions, each consisting of three 
levels, which indicates how the subject is functioning on these dimensions. The five 
dimensions are mobility, self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort and anxiety/depression. 
The descriptions were printed on cards and handed to the subjects (see Appendix). It was 
made clear to the subjects that health state γ meant they were able to function perfectly on all 
five EQ-5D dimensions, irrespective of their age. The same health states were used in the 
utility of life duration and TTO parts to avoid distorting influences of different behavior for 
different health states (e.g., if different utility functions existed for different health states). 
The choice [matching] task of the fixed-nβ procedure fixed the number of years with 
health problems and varied [asked for] the number of years in full health until [for which] the 
subject was indifferent. Conversely, the choice [matching] task of the fixed-nγ procedure fixed 
the number of years in full health and varied [asked for] the number of years with health 
problems until [for which] the subject was indifferent. 
The answers of the subject in the fixed-nβ [fixed-nγ] procedure were stored and used as 
the gauge duration for that subject in the subsequently included fixed-nγ [fixed-nβ] procedure. 
The rationale for this procedure was to reduce distorting influences, such as an influence of 
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utility of life duration. If a subject was internally consistent, her answer in the last procedure 
then had to be equal to the initial gauge duration used in the first procedure (Attema and 
Brouwer, 2008; Attema and Brouwer, forthcoming; Bleichrodt et al., 2003). 
 In order to check general data quality, we included a reliability test in the choice task 
by repeating the second or third iteration for some randomly selected questions at the end of 
an iteration sequence.  
 
3.2.1. Utility of life duration  
 Utility of life duration was elicited by the risk-free direct method (Attema et al., 
forthcoming), also using a bisection procedure. The subjects’ task in this method is to 
compare two different health profiles, each consisting of two health states: β and γ, with γêβ. 
In the first health profile, A=(h1=γ,…,hm=γ,hm+1=β,…,hT=β), the subject gets an immediate 
improvement in health from β to γ, which lasts until time point m, after which the subject 
returns to health state β until point T. In the second health profile, 
B=(h1=β,…,hm=β,hm+1=γ,…,hT=γ), he starts in health state β and will be in that health state 
until time point m. Then he will get the health improvement towards health state γ, and he will 
remain in γ until time point T. After T, the two options yield the same health state. Suppose 
that γ and β represent full health (i.e., EQ-5D state 11111) and EQ-5D state 21111 (i.e., a state 
with no problems except for some problems in walking about), respectively. Profile A means, 
in this case, that the subject will be in full health (and, hence, will have relief from problems 
in walking about) from now on during the following m years. After m years, the relief ends 
and he will have some problems in walking about from point m until point T. Making use of 
choices, we can find an indifference value for m, which means that the subject is indifferent 
between A and B. Considering the above framework, this indifference gives the following 
equality: 
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(4) [ ] [ ] )()()()()()()()()()( γββγ vmWTWvmWvmWTWvmW −+=−+ .  
 
Attema et al. (forthcoming) show that estimates of )(
2
1)( TWmW =  can be obtained in this way. 
W(T) can be normalized to 1, so that we in fact elicit a midpoint, which splits the total period 
into two parts (one before and one after) that both give the same utility of life duration. For 
example, if m=20 and T=50, this implies that the first 20 years are given the same value as the 
30 years thereafter. More details about the implementation of this method can be found in 
Attema and Brouwer (2009).  
 The utility of life duration task also included a reliability test, by repeating the first 
question of the first iteration at the end of that iteration. The answer given in the initial 
question was used in the analysis, so the answer to the repeat question was solely used for the 
reliability test. 
 
3.3. Stimuli 
We considered two constant health profiles throughout the experiment, denoted by the 
two-attribute options B=(β, nβ) and G=(γ, nγ), with β representing ‘EQ-5D state 21111’ and γ 
representing ‘full health’. The health state ‘21111’ is a mild health state and subjects were 
likely to know people suffering from it.  
 The values of the gauge durations depended on the version (Table 2). For example, in 
version 1, we could set the gauge durations of the fixed-nβ choice procedure and the fixed-nγ 
matching procedure. However, the gauge durations for the fixed-nγ choice procedure and the 
fixed-nβ matching procedure were the answers given by the subjects in the former two 
procedures, and, hence, varied between the subjects. We used the following gauge durations 
in the fixed-nβ procedure (both for the choice and the matching task) for the subjects who 
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received the fixed-nβ procedure first (versions 1 and 4 for choice, and versions 2 and 3 for 
matching): βn =3, 10, and 31 years. For example, in the fixed-nβ procedure with gauge 
duration βn =3, the subject was asked to imagine living 3 more years in state 21111 and then 
die. The alternative was to regain full health, at the expense of lifetime. The subject was then 
asked to state the number of years in full health such that the two options were indifferent 
(matching), or to choose the baseline scenario (21111, 3 years) or its alternative (11111, x 
years) (choice). 
 We also included three fixed-nγ questions both for choice and for matching. The 
subjects answering the fixed-nγ procedure first (versions 2 and 3 for choice, and 1 and 4 for 
matching) got the following gauge duration: mnγ =2, 7, and 26 years. Now, the remainder of 
the sample got a gauge duration which was the answer they gave in the fixed-nβ procedure. 
For ease of comparison, we will only refer to n=3, 10, and 31 years in the remainder of this 
paper. Hence, when writing n=31, we can also refer to mnγ = 26, or the answer given to 
mnγ = 
26. This will be clear from the context. 
 The first question in both procedures of the choice task was intended to test whether 
subjects had understood the task: it used the same duration for both health states and, hence, 
the option with full health was dominant. If a subject chose for the option with inferior health, 
this implied a violation of monotonicity because a life of given duration in inferior health was 
preferred to a life of the same length in full health. The subject was given an explanation for 
why this choice may not be very reasonable and given the opportunity to reconsider her 
choice. If the subject still held on to this choice, she was redirected toward the next question. 
These subjects were not included in the analysis. A similar procedure was used for the 
matching task. There, a subject was given an explanation when her answer implied one of the 
  19
options was strictly better in both attributes, so that this could not represent a reasonable 
indifference. 
 In the matching task, the subject could give his answers up to two decimals. The 
minimum in the fixed-nβ procedure was 0, while there was no maximum in the fixed-nγ 
procedure. For choices, the minimum in the fixed-nβ procedure could not reach exactly 0. It 
was 0.1 for n=3, 0.25 for n=10, and 1 for n=31. The maximum for the fixed-nγ procedure was 
64.5 for n=2, 68.5 for n=7, and 77 for n=26.4 The constraints for the procedure that the subject 
received at second depended on the answers the subject gave in the procedure received at first 
and, hence, differed between subjects. Because we used a very mild health state, we did not 
allow subjects to value a health state negatively (i.e., as worse than dead), which would 
require a separate procedure (Torrance, 1986). However, this seems not to have biased our 
results, since none of the subjects attached the lowest possible value to this health state in the 
fixed-nβ procedure. 
 
3.4. Analyses 
 The hypotheses were tested by comparing the TTO scores (v), since different TTO 
scores captured the response patterns that caused preference reversals. In particular, we 
compared the estimates of v for the four different procedures. Only nonparametric Wilcoxon 
signed ranks tests are reported for the within-subjects analyses, since the data were 
nonnormally distributed for 5 of the 12 variables (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p<0.05). In case 
the conclusion implied by the paired t-test differed from that implied by the Wilcoxon test, we 
also report the results of the former. 
The between-subjects analysis only included the answers given to the first two 
procedures the subject received. Consequently, this only involved questions with exogenous 
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gauge durations, eliminating heterogeneity in the stimuli. Moreover, there is no possible 
distortion caused by recall in this analysis. The experiment was designed in such a way that 
all hypotheses could be tested with similar power. Hypothesis 1 was tested by comparing cvβ  
for subjects in versions 1 and 4 to mvβ  for subjects in versions 2 and 3, and cvγ  for versions 2 
and 3 was compared to mvγ  for versions 1 and 4. Hypothesis 2 was tested by comparing 
cvβ  for 
versions 1 and 4 to cvγ  for versions 2 and 3, and 
mvβ  for versions 2 and 3 to 
mvγ  for versions 1 
and 4. These analyses were performed by means of nonparametric Mann-Whitney tests. In 
case the conclusion implied by the independent samples t-test differed from that implied by 
the Mann-Whitney test, we also report the results of the former. All reported p-values are two-
sided. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
We removed the data of four subjects from the analysis, because their answers 
violated dominance. Therefore, 76 subjects (mean age 19.9, s.d. 1.8, 48 men) were included in 
the analysis. Table 3 shows the distribution of the subjects across the four versions. 
 
<TABLE 3 HERE> 
 
The replication of the second iteration led to the same choice as the initial question in 
98% of the cases, indicating a good reliability. The replication of the third iteration led to the 
same choice in 77.6% of the cases. This lower reliability was to be expected, since the 
                                                                                                                                                   
4
 The minimum answer given in the fixed-nβ procedure of the matching task was 1, and the maximum answer 
given in the fixed-nγ procedure was 80. Therefore, the lack of a constraint did not distort the comparison with the 
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stimulus value was likely to be closer to the indifference value in the third iteration. 
Reliability in the discounting task was also good, with 90.8% choosing the same option in the 
replicated question. 
 
4.1. Choice vs. Matching 
Figures 2 compares the medians of the TTO scores obtained by the fixed-nβ choice 
and the fixed-nβ matching procedures, plotted against the gauge durations. Figure 3 does the 
same for the fixed-nγ procedures. The figures indicate a violation of procedural invariance. In 
particular, the results make clear that the matching task indeed generated higher TTO scores 
over the entire duration range for the fixed-nβ procedure, although the difference was not very 
large and declined with duration. For the fixed-nγ procedure, however, the TTO scores were 
significantly higher for choice than for matching, with the difference between tasks 
substantially greater than for the fixed-nβ procedure. The only resemblance to the fixed-nβ 
procedure was the declining difference for longer durations. 
 
<FIGURE 2 AND 3 HERE> 
 
Tables 4 and 5 give more detailed statistics. Concerning the fixed-nβ procedure, the 
TTO scores differed significantly between choice and matching for two out of the three gauge 
durations (p<0.01 for n=3 and 10; p=0.08 for n=31).5 Furthermore, the TTO scores were 
significantly higher for choice than for matching in the fixed-nγ procedure, for all three gauge 
durations (p<0.01), implying a rejection of Hypothesis 1 for this procedure as well. However, 
this rejection was not in favor of the alternative hypothesis, which predicted higher TTO 
                                                                                                                                                   
choice task. 
5
 The p-values for the paired t-test were p<0.01, p=0.10, and p=0.13 for the n=3, 10, and 31, respectively. 
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scores for matching than for choice due to scale compatibility being expected to exert an 
upward influence in matching but not in choice. 
 
<TABLES 4 AND 5 HERE> 
 
Our results were confirmed in the between-subjects test. The Mann-Whitney test 
indicated higher TTO scores for matching than for choices in the fixed-nβ procedure, but the 
difference was significant at the 5% level only for n=3 (p=0.02)6. The opposite pattern 
occurred for the fixed-nγ procedure, with TTO scores for matching being significantly lower 
than TTO scores for choices (p<0.05 for all durations)7. 
 
4.2. Procedural invariance 
Figures 4 and 5 compare the two variants within the matching task and within the 
choice task, respectively, again plotted against the gauge durations. These are the same data 
points as those of Figures 2 and 3, but combined in a different way. Interestingly, the 
matching task generated a substantial difference between the fixed-nβ and the fixed-nγ 
procedures, especially for short durations. The choice task, by contrast, did not generate these 
differences. 
 
<FIGURES 4 AND 5 HERE> 
                                               
6
 According to the t-test, this difference was significant at the 6% level (p=0.06 for n=3). 
7
 The difference was not significant for n=31 according to the t-test, however (p=0.17). 
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Table 6 shows the relevant differences for Hypothesis 2, as computed from the data 
given in Tables 4 and 5. The null of Hypothesis 2 could be rejected, in favor of the alternative, 
in the matching task (p<0.01 for all three gauge durations). That is, the fixed-nβ procedure 
generated higher TTO scores than the fixed-nγ procedure. However, the evidence was not so 
clear for the choice task. There we found significantly higher TTO scores under the fixed-nβ 
procedure for the 3-year gauge duration (p<0.01), no significant difference for the 10-year 
gauge duration (p=0.36), and significantly lower TTO scores under the fixed-nγ for the 31-
year gauge duration (p<0.05)8. 
 
<TABLE 6 HERE> 
 
Between subjects, TTO scores were significantly higher under the fixed-nβ matching 
procedure than under the fixed-nγ matching procedure for n=3 and n=10 (p<0.01), and 
marginally significantly higher for n=31 (p=0.06)9. Within the choice task, no significant 
differences were found between the two procedures in the between-subjects test (p>0.08). 
Hence, the lack of significant differences within the fixed-nβ procedure and within choices in 
the within-subjects analysis did not seem to be due to remembrance effects, since the 
between-subjects analysis gave the same conclusions, and even showed a tendency towards 
more equality within the choice task. 
 
4.3. Preference reversals within choice and within matching 
The results of Section 4.2 suggest a higher rate of preference reversal within matching 
tasks than within choice tasks. The third hypothesis could test this suspicion more formally. 
This required the computation of the absolute values of the within-task differences between 
                                               
8
 However, this difference is only significant at the 7% level in the paired t-test. 
9
 p=0.44 according to the t-test. 
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TTO scores generated by the fixed-nβ and fixed-nγ procedures. Table 7 presents some 
resulting summary statistics. 
 
<TABLE 7 HERE> 
 
The statistical tests confirmed our presumption. The absolute differences were higher 
within matching than within choice for all three gauge durations, and significantly so for two 
of them (p<0.01 for )3(2/)2(3 AnAn == γβ , and )10(7/)7(10 AnAn == γβ ; p=0.17 for 
)31(26/)26(31 AnAn == γβ ).  
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
The preference reversal phenomenon is a serious problem in decision theory. When 
strategically equivalent elicitation procedures produce different preference orderings, it 
becomes difficult to set priorities in budget allocations. The important question then arises 
which procedure should be used to generate the values to be used in these allocations. 
Previous studies on preference reversals mainly highlighted that different elicitation 
procedures generated systematically different preferences, but could not give directions as to 
whether one procedure was more valid than another. This paper has made an attempt to 
provide such directions, by introducing a new test for the internal consistency of different 
preference elicitation methods. In particular, we investigated whether differences exist in the 
degree to which different procedures capture people’s preferences consistently. The main 
advantage of our test is that it provides a benchmark against which to evaluate the validity of 
different estimates, obtained from different elicitation procedures; a lower degree of 
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preference reversals for different procedures within one task than within another task would 
seem a logical reason to attach more validity to the former, assuming no other information is 
available. 
Our study confirmed the pattern found in other studies on preference reversals. In 
particular, choice and matching elicitation procedures caused significant differences in 
valuations. In addition, we have confirmed the findings of Bostic et al. (1990) that choice 
tasks generate fewer inconsistencies than matching tasks. Bostic et al. (1990) used a series of 
choices to determine a cash amount that was indifferent to a given bet. They found that this 
led to fewer ‘traditional’ preference reversals than a matching task where the subjects simply 
had to state a cash amount that caused indifference. We found that eliciting indifference 
through choice series also reduces another kind of preference reversal, i.e., one that is caused 
by using different response modes within a task. Moreover, we used other outcomes (health 
instead of money) than Bostic et al. (1990), indicating that this pattern holds in other domains 
as well, and may therefore be a more universal phenomenon. 
We also obtained some more surprising results. First, the finding of lower TTO scores 
for matching than for choice in the fixed-nγ procedure is not in agreement with the result 
predicted by scale compatibility (Bleichrodt, 2002). Our framework offers two possible 
explanations for this finding. One possibility is that scale compatibility is not only present in 
the matching task, but also, and even to a higher extent, in the choice task. This explanation 
does not seem intuitively appealing, however, because the response scale is not likely to be 
more prominent in the choice task than in the matching task. A second explanation is that the 
deflating effect of loss aversion is stronger in the matching task than in the choice task 
(Attema and Brouwer, forthcoming; Bleichrodt et al., 2003). We believe that the latter 
explanation is more realistic, as the matching task puts more emphasis on the fact that 
something has to be given up in order to improve health status. 
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Another remarkable result is the finding of lower TTO scores for the fixed-nβ 
procedure than for the fixed-nγ procedure for the longest gauge duration of the choice task. 
However, this difference was only significant at the 5%-level according to the Wilcoxon 
signed ranks test, and it was not significantly different according to the paired t-test. Hence, 
the difference seems not robust enough to attach any firm conclusion to this result.  
Although not the main objective of this study, an interesting finding was the declining 
difference between procedures, as well as between tasks, for longer gauge durations. This 
suggests that the influence of loss aversion wears off with duration, which was also found in 
several other studies (Attema and Brouwer, 2008; Attema and Brouwer, forthcoming; 
Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2002; Bleichrodt et al., 2003). Hence, the use of longer gauge durations 
may be useful to reduce any bias due to loss aversion. 
Some limitations of the present study are worth mentioning. First, we used a student 
population, which may hamper the generalization of the results. However, we have no reason 
to suspect that preference reversals occur less often among the general population. University 
students are likely to have higher cognitive skills than the average of the general population, 
and, therefore, could be expected to be less deviant from rationality. 
Second, subjects may have recalled their answers in the choice [matching] procedure 
and put in those values in the matching [choice] procedure because they for example thought 
the experimenter wanted this. This reasoning is unlikely to have caused problems, however, 
since the matching and choice tasks were interspersed by filler tasks. Moreover, our findings 
of substantial differences between the procedures indicate that recall did not play a significant 
role. If it did, it would make the problem of preference reversals even more severe, because it 
would have decreased the frequency of preference reversals and, hence, this frequency would 
be even higher if there were no recall. The likely absence of recall effects is emphasized by 
the similar number of preference reversals in the between-subjects analysis. 
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Related to this second limitation, notice that subjects did not see the exact value of the 
point of indifference derived under the choice task (as this was inferred from their choices), 
but did for matching. Therefore, recall seems more likely in matching. The fact that we, 
nonetheless, observed larger differences for matching, further disqualifies matching. 
A third limitation is that the implementation of real incentives was hindered by our use 
of health instead of monetary outcomes. However, there is no clear-cut evidence that real 
incentives generate different results than hypothetical incentives (Abdellaoui et al., 2011; 
Anderson and Mellor, 2009; Beattie and Loomes, 1997), only that they may reduce noise 
(Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). 
The results we reported in this paper are of relevance not only for (experimental) 
economists, but for policy makers as well. For instance, budget allocation decisions in health 
care are often influenced by the outcomes of economic evaluations, which in turn rely on 
stated preference methods, such as the ones investigated in this paper, to estimate utilities 
resulting from different health interventions. Our results suggest these estimates are 
systematically and substantially different for alternative, strategically equivalent, procedures. 
Therefore, the choice of the elicitation procedure in an economic evaluation can have 
profound implications for priority setting in health care and the allocation of other public 
resources. 
To summarize, we have shown that within choices there is more consistency between 
different procedures than within matching. Therefore, the neutral frame and closed-ended 
format of choice tasks seem to be less susceptible to biases than matching tasks. In that sense, 
the increase in questions necessary to elicit values in choice elicitation tasks may be 
considered worthwhile given its higher internal consistency. Our results give tentative support 
for a more widespread use of choice-based elicitation tasks in utility assessment. We 
emphasize, however, that a higher internal consistency is not synonymous to a better ability to 
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capture true preferences. Internal consistency is just a necessary, but not sufficient, 
characteristic of preference elicitation methods. More studies in this important field would be 
welcomed to confirm these findings and extend them to other characteristics – or to falsify 
them and, hence, reverse our preference for choice-based tasks. 
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Appendix: Health state descriptions 
 
Card 1 – EQ-5D state 21111 
 
You have regular back pain. This has the following consequences for your functioning in 
daily life: 
 
 You have some problems in walking about. 
 You have no problems to wash or dress yourself. 
 You have no problems with your usual activities. 
 You have no pain or other discomfort. 
    You are not anxious or depressed. 
 
 
Card 2 – EQ-5D state 11111 (Full Health) 
 
You have no complaints and are in full health. This has the following consequences for your 
functioning in daily life: 
 
 You have no problems in walking about. 
 You have no problems to wash or dress yourself. 
 You have no problems with your usual activities. 
 You have no pain or other discomfort. 
 You are not anxious or depressed. 
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TABLES 
 
TABLE 1. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
  Elicitation task 
 
 Choice  Matching 
 
 Fixed nβ (give up n) 
 
Direction of trade-off   
 Fixed nγ (gain n) 
 
 
 
TABLE 2. ORDER OF THE TASKS 
VERSION 
 
 
 
 
 
TASK NUMBER 
 
  
 
cvβ  
mvβ  
cvγ  
mvγ  
 Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4 
1. cvβ  
mvβ  
cvγ  
mvγ  
2. Filler task Filler task Filler task Filler task 
3. cvγ  
mvγ  
mvβ  
cvβ  
4. Filler task Filler task Filler task Filler task 
5. mvγ  
cvγ  
cvβ  
mvβ  
6. Filler task Filler task Filler task Filler task 
7. mvβ  
cvβ  
mvγ  
cvγ  
8. Discounting Discounting Discounting Discounting 
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TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF SUBJECTS ACROSS VERSIONS [INCLUDED SUBJECTS WITHIN BRACKETS] 
 
 
 
TABLE 4. FIXED-Nβ PROCEDURE 
  
)2(/3 An =β  )7(/10 An =β  )26(/31 An =β  
cvβ  Average 0.74 0.76 0.82 
 
Std. deviation 0.21 0.18 0.17 
 
Median 0.78 0.80 0.87 
 
Interquartile range 0.61-0.91 0.65-0.90 0.78-0.93 
mvβ  Average 0.81 0.80 0.85 
 
Std. deviation 0.17 0.19 0.16 
 
Median 0.83 0.84 0.89 
 
Interquartile range 0.67-0.95 0.76-0.91 0.83-0.96 
mvβ -
cvβ  Average 0.07 0.04 0.03 
 
Median 0.05 0.04 0.02 
 
TABLE 5. FIXED-Nγ PROCEDURE 
  
)3(/2 An =γ  )10(/7 An =γ  )31(/26 An =γ  
cvγ  Average 0.66 0.75 0.85 
 Std. deviation 0.22 0.18 0.13 
 Median 0.69 0.80 0.90 
 Interquartile range 0.53-0.83 0.66-0.87 0.80-0.94 
mvγ  Average 0.49 0.62 0.79 
 Std. deviation 0.25 0.20 0.16 
 Median 0.45 0.62 0.85 
 Interquartile range 0.29-0.67 0.50-0.78 0.72-0.90 
mvγ -
cvγ  Average -0.17 -0.13 -0.06 
 Median -0.24 -0.18 -0.05 
 
Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4 
19 [18] 20 22 [20] 19 [18] 
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TABLE 6. COMPARISON OF PROCEDURES 
 
 
 
)2(/3 An =β  
)3(/2 An =γ  
)7(/10 An =β  
)10(/7 An =γ  
)26(/31 An =β  
)31(/26 An =γ  
mvβ -
mvγ  Average 0.32 0.18 0.06 
 
Median 0.38 0.22 0.04 
cvβ -
cvγ  Average 0.08 0.01 -0.03 
 Median 0.09 0 -0.03 
 
TABLE 7. WITHIN-CHOICE AND WITHIN-MATCHING ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCES 
  )2(/3 An =β  
)3(/2 An =γ  
)7(/10 An =β  
)10(/7 An =γ  
)26(/31 An =β  
)31(/26 An =γ  
cc vv γβ −  Average 0.15 0.10 0.08 
 Std. deviation 0.15 0.13 0.11 
 Median 0.11 0.05 0.04 
 Interquartile range 0.03-0.25 0.03-0.12 0.02-0.10 
 
    
mm vv γβ −  Average 0.33 0.20 0.10 
 Std. deviation 0.24 0.18 0.11 
 Median 0.31 0.17 0.06 
 Interquartile range 0.14-0.49 0.08-0.27 0.02-0.12 
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FIGURES 
 
FIGURE 1. REVERSIBILITY OF THE INDIFFERENCE CURVE 
 
 
 nγ nβ nβ' Duration 
 
FIGURE 2. MEDIAN TTO SCORES FOR FIXED-Nβ CHOICE AND MATCHING PROCEDURES, USING SEVERAL 
GAUGE DURATIONS 
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FIGURE 3. MEDIAN TTO SCORES FOR FIXED-Nγ CHOICE AND MATCHING PROCEDURES, USING SEVERAL 
GAUGE DURATIONS 
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FIGURE 4. MEDIAN TTO SCORES FOR FIXED-Nβ AND FIXED-Nγ MATCHING PROCEDURES, USING 
SEVERAL GAUGE DURATIONS 
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FIGURE 5. MEDIAN TTO SCORES FOR FIXED-Nβ AND FIXED-Nγ CHOICE PROCEDURES, USING SEVERAL 
GAUGE DURATIONS  
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